Logical Accessment of Vulnerability at Departing Passengers Control
- Carl Rizk
- Sibusiso Moyo
- Hadj Batatia
- Felix Mora-Camino
Civil Aviation Administration of Lebanon · Research, Innovation & Engagement, Durban University of Technology · University of Toulouse, INPT, ENSEEIHT-IRIT-TéSA · UFF, Labo ENAC-France and Durban University of Technology
- Evento
- XVIII SITRAER – Brasília, DF, Brasil, 22 a 24 de outubro de 2019
- Volume
- Tecnologia Avançada de Transporte Aéreo no Brasil: trabalhos apresentados ao XVIII SITRAER · ISBN 978-65-00-03772-2
- Páginas
- 126–134
- Editora
- Universidade de Brasília (UnB)
- Editores
- Li Weigang, Victor Rafael Rezende Celestino, Leonardo L. B. V. Cruciol
Abstract
This study develops a logical framework to access the vulnerability of passenger control process at airports to different threats. The initial objective is to determine in which conditions a threat will be able to go undetected through a departure passengers control process. In this study are not considered or estimated probabilities of occurrence of passenger control failures, but only their possibility and the conditions for that. Here a logical framework is developed to establish the logical constraint each inspection station must satisfy to insure robustness to malicious behavior. Considering the nature of the resulting logical satisfiability problem, an approach based on a graph representation of the control process is adopted, leading to consider minimum length paths representative of optimal malicious behavior.
Keywords: Airport security; passenger screening; complex systems; logical constraints; controlled satisfiability graphs; path optimization