Prisoner's Dilemma Game Approach to Decision Optimization in Collaborative Trajectory Options Program
- Leonardo Cruciol
- John-Paul Clarke
- Li Weigang
TransLab, University of Brasilia · Daniel Guggenheim School of Aerospace Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology
- Evento
- XVIII SITRAER – Brasília, DF, Brasil, 22 a 24 de outubro de 2019
- Volume
- Tecnologia Avançada de Transporte Aéreo no Brasil: trabalhos apresentados ao XVIII SITRAER · ISBN 978-65-00-03772-2
- Páginas
- 412–421
- Editora
- Universidade de Brasília (UnB)
- Editores
- Li Weigang, Victor Rafael Rezende Celestino, Leonardo L. B. V. Cruciol
Abstract
Using the Collaborative Trajectory Options Program (CTOP), one important action to achieve the airlines' business goals is to allocate available slots for flight to fly through a Flow Constrained Area (FCA) by combining rerouting and delay at the same restrictive measure. Although, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) turned this collaborative environment possible, when a CTOP demand is initiated, each airline has knowledge only about its own flights related to CTOP. The lack of decision knowledge from other airlines is the challenge in CTOP application. This paper presents a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game approach to indicate how many route preferences should be sent by each airline to reduce its delay in continuous operation. The novel solution is developed with learning capacity by the CTOP negotiations and adapting the Decision Support System (DSS) behavior to improve the results in every game round. With predicting the possible future scenarios and airline competitors' strategies, the learning process is well conducted not only depending on more information from other airlines. Comparing with the traditional allocation strategy in case study of two airlines A and B, it is possible to get an improvement rate in delay allocation about 21%, achieving a delay reduction up to 649 hours for Airline A.
Keywords: Air Traffic Management; CTOP; Decision Support System; Game Theory; Uncertain Systems